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Abstract. We propose a novel proof technique that can be applied to
attack a broad class of problems in computational complexity, when
switching the order of universal and existential quantifiers is helpful. Our
approach combines the standard min-max theorem and convex approx-
imation techniques, offering quantitative improvements over the stan-
dard way of using min-max theorems as well as more concise and elegant
proofs.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Min-Max Theorem.
The celebrate von Neumann min-max theorem [Neu28] states that every finite,
two-player, zero-sum game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies. That is, the
maximum value of the minimum expected gain for one player is equal to the
minimum value of the maximum expected loss for the other. Any zero-sum game
can be represented as a payoff matrix
A = [A(x, y)]x∈X,y∈Y
where A(x, y) is the payoff in case when the X-player chooses strategy x ∈ X
and the Y -player chooses strategy y ∈ Y , understood as a gain for the X-
player and a loss of the Y -player. The basic moves x ∈ X, y ∈ Y are called
pure strategies (think of one of 3 options in the rock-paper-scissors game). We
allow the players to use randomized strategies, which are called mixed strategies
(think of picking a random answer in the rock-paper-scissors game) represented
formally as distributions pX(·), pY (·) over X and Y respectively, and analyze the
expected payoff
Ey∼pY ,x∼pXA(x, y) =
∑
y
∑
x
pY (y)pX(x)A(x, y).
If the player X goes first, she can guarantee her gain to be at least
MaxGain(X) = max
pX
min
y
Ex∼pXA(x, y),
and when the player Y goes first he guarantees his lost to be at most
MinLoss(Y ) = min
pY
max
x
Ey∼pY A(x, y),
where in both equations we used the fact that the second player always achieves
the best response with some pure strategy. The min-max theorem guarantees
that we have an equilibrium between the players.
Theorem (Min-Max Theorem [Neu28]). With the notation as above (and
players using mixed strategies), we have
MaxGain(X) = MinLoss(Y ).
Many more general versions of the min-max theorem exist. All of them assure
the equality
sup
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
f(x, y) = inf
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
f(x, y)
under certain conditions imposed on the sets X,Y (for example both convex
and compact subsets of a locally convex topological space) and the function f
(for example continuity, convexity in y and concavity in x). The proofs typically
use fixed point theorems. Min-Max theorems have a lot of applications in game
theory, statistical decision theory, economy and theoretical computer science. In
this paper we focus on applications in cryptography, and the simplest version
will be enough for our discussion.
1.2 Switching the order of quantifiers by the min-max theorem
The min-max theorem may be used to change the order of quantifiers (minimiza-
tion corresponds to the existential quantifier and maximization corresponds to
the universal quantifier). A very good example is the classical hardcore lemma
due to Impagliazzo [Imp95]. The lemma stated informally says that if for every
algorithm A there exists a large set of inputs on which A fails to compute a
fixed function f , then in fact there exists a large set of inputs on which every
algorithm fails to compute f with probability close to 12 . This particular lemma
falls into a broad class of results in complexity theory which can be proven using
the min-max theorem. We explain this technique before giving more examples.
The general framework. Let A be a class of test functions (for example
poly-size circuits) over a set of possible inputs I and C be a class of distributions
over I satisfying certain desired properties (for example samplability, high den-
sity, high entropy etc.), and v be a payoff function quantifies how well A performs
on the input X (for example, unpredictability or distinguishing advantage). Sup-
pose that we want to prove the existence of a distribution with certain properties
for which every algorithm has bad (or alternatively good) performance.
Dream Statement. There is a distribution over inputs (with some cer-
tain properties) such that every algorithm performs badly/well.
∃X ∈ C ∀A ∈ A v(A, X) 6 c (1)
In many cases, it is much easier to prove a weaker version, which gives the exis-
tence of a distribution with desired properties but only for a chosen algorithm.
Weak Statement. For every algorithm there is a distribution over in-
puts (with some certain properties) such that it performs badly/well.
∀A ∈ A ∃X ∈ C : v(A, X) 6 c (2)
Note that this condition is considerably weaker. Indeed, we will see that in
many applications proving the existence of a suitable distribution X for a fixed
algorithm A is actually trivial. But the big question is whether Equation (2)
implies Equation (1)
Does the Weak Statement imply the Dream Statement? Suppose
that Equation (2) holds. Can we conclude that Equation (1) also holds,
with possibly somewhat weaker class A and a weaker parameter c?
Note that we allow for some loss in quality (a weaker class of algorithms or
a weaker payoff). Indeed, if both sets C and A are convex the answer is triv-
ially “yes”, by the min-max theorem. However, in most applications the set A
consists of efficient algorithms (circuits of a bounded size) and is not convex,
because taking a mixed strategy corresponds to combining many algorithms by
(possibly) inefficient sampling. For the same reason, the set C might not be con-
vex. However, we might “embed” non-convex sets A and C into “almost” convex
hulls of A′, C′ which are (hopefully) still sufficiently good for our purpose, by
taking moderately long mixed strategies, instead of arbitrarily long. Indeed, let
∀A ∈ A ∀X ∈ C ∃A′ ∈ convA′ ∃X ′ ∈ conv C′ : |v(A,X)− v(A′, X ′)| 6 δ
(3)
where the conv operator denotes the convex hull. We get the following
Approximate Min-Max Theorem If the condition (3) holds, then
the Weak Statement implies the Dream Statement is true with A and C
replaced by A′ and C′.
1.3 Our contribution
Summary. This framework is well known (cf. [BSW03,RTTV08,TTV08,Hol05,VZ]
to mention only some papers closely related to our cryptographic applications).
What we offer, is a novel approximation technique. Previous works used to find
A
′ and X ′ in convex hulls by a trivial Chernoff approximation argument. We
observe that much better results are obtained with a carefully chosen convex
approximation technique. Indeed, it turns out that in many cases the quantity
|v(A,X)− v(A′, X ′)| can be upper bounded by the Ho¨lder Inequality which in-
volves moments of A and X . These moments may be better estimated based on
properties of the sets A and C which leads to quantitative improvements. We
stress that the key component is the right choice of Ho¨lder conjugates, that is
the exponents for the corresponding Lp, Lq spaces.
Advantages and Applications of our framework. Using our technique
we prove a whole bunch of results, reproving what is already known in a more
clear and concise way, improving quantitative bounds, or obtaining new results.
Details are given in Section 2.
1.4 Related Works.
The work of [VZ] provides a tool to derive good bounds for certain sets C, in the
uniform settings. We stress that we consider only non-uniform adversaries here.
In fact, our results can be probably made uniform by the use of constructive ver-
sions of auxiliary results on convex approximations we have applied (for example
[DDGS97]). Anyway, uniform settings are not important for most of our appli-
cations like leakage-resilient crypto. While [VZ] gives hard bounds, we provide
a framework equipped with a different technique of handling C. Our technique
can exploit moment conditions, which is impossible in [VZ]. We stress that the
crucial component of our technique is the
2 Applications
We briefly recall some basic notation and conventions. We say that two dis-
tributions X1, X2 are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable if for every A of size s we have
|EA(X1)− EA(X2)| 6 ǫ.
2.1 Impagliazzo Hardcore Lemma
Impagliazzo Hardcore Lemma. Suppose that are given a function f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1} that is mildly hard to predict by a class of circuits; for every circuit A
from our class, A(x) and f(x) agree on at most, say, a 0.99 fraction of inputs
x. This might happen when there is a set of noticeable size on which f is ex-
tremely hard to predict, meaning that there is (almost) no advantage over a
random guess. This set could be as big as a 0.02 = 2(1− 0.99) fraction of input.
Indeed, if f cannot be guessed better than with probability 12 on this set, then
the probability that D agrees with f is at most 0.02 · 12 + 0.98 · 1 = 0.99.
Quite surprisingly, this intuitive characterization is true. The first such result
was proved by Impagliazzo [Imp95], with a sub-optimal hardcore density. An
improved version with the optimal density of the hardcore set was found by
Holenstein [Hol05]. Below we present the best possible result due to Klivans and
Servedio, the lower bound was given in [LTW07].
Theorem 1 (Optimal Unpredictability Hardcore Lemma [KS03]). Let
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be ǫ-unpredictable by circuits of size s under a distribution
V , that is
Pr
x←V
[A(x) = f(x)] 6 1− ǫ
2
, for every A of size at most s. (4)
Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a event E of probability ǫ such that f is 1− δ
unpredictable under V |E by circuits of size s′ = Ω (sδ2/ log(1/ǫ)), that is
Pr
x←V |E
[A(x) = f(x)] 6
1 + δ
2
, for every A of size at most s′. (5)
Our Contribution. We reprove Theorem 1 using the framework discussed in
Section 1.3. Our approach has the following advantages over the related works:
(a) It is derived from the standard min-max theorem. Previous proofs which
achieve optimal parameters require involved iterative arguments [KS03,VZ].
(b) It is modular and much simpler than all alternative proofs. Indeed, the
argument of Holenstein is non-optimal and involved. Also the argument given
by Vadhan and Zheng depends on a non-trivial trick attributed to Nissan and
Levy (which improves the hardcore density from ǫ2 to ǫ) and the machinery is
much heavier. Our approach does not require this trick and follows the most
intuitive strategy: show that there is a hardcore for every fixed adversary
and then switch the order of quantifiers.
(c) We have identified the reason for non-optimality in previous proofs. Some
authors even suggested that it might be impossible to get the tight param-
eters using the standard min-max theorem [VZ]. We show that this is not
true. The problem is not with the standard min-max theorem but with an
inadequate approximation argument in previous works, which do uniform
approximation [Hol05].
A comparison is given below in Table 1.
Author Technique Hardcore Density Complexity Loss
[Imp95] boosting (constructive approx.) Pr[E] = ǫ
2
O(δ−2 · poly(1/ǫ))
[Hol05] standard min-max + Hardcore Optimization Pr[E] = ǫ O(nδ−2)
[LTW07] complicated boosting (constructive approx.) Pr[E] = ǫ O(log(1/ǫ)δ−2)
[VZ] complicated boosting (constructive approx.) Pr[E] = ǫ O(log(1/ǫ)δ−2)
this paper simple min-max + Lp-approx. Pr[E] = ǫ O(log(1/ǫ)δ
−2)
Table 1: Hardcore lemmas obtained by different techniques.
A sketch of proof. Assume without losing generality that f : {0, 1}n →
{−1, 1}1. Define the payoff v as the unpredictability of f by A under X
v(A,X)
def
= Pr
x←X
[f(x) = A(x)] =
1 + Ex←XA(x) · f(x)
2
,
1 We consider {−1, 1} outputs for technical convenience. Equivalently we could state
the problem for {0, 1}.
and note that this definition makes sense also for circuits with real outputs. Let
the property set C consists of conditional distributions of the form X = V |E
where Pr[E] > ǫ and E may vary2 ; note that C is convex. Define A as the
set of real-valued3 circuits of size s, and let A′ be the set of circuits of size
s′ = sδ−2 log(1/ǫ) . It is not hard to see that the assumption (4) implies
Proposition 1 ( Weak Statement ). For every A ∈ A we have v(X,A) 6 0
for some X ∈ C.
Now we analyze what happens when we replace A by conv(A′). We claim that
Proposition 2 (Approximation Step). For every A′ ∈ conv(A′) we have
v(X,A′) 6 δ for some X ∈ C.
To prove this, we show that the Ho¨lder Inequality implies for A,A′ and X ∈ C
|v(X,A)− v(X,A′)| 6 1
2
(
Ex←V
(
PV |E(x)
PV (x)
)q) 1q
· (Ex←V ∣∣A(x) −A′(x)∣∣p) 1p
for any p, q > 1, 1p +
1
q = 1. Now we can argue that
(a)
(
Ex←V
(
PV |E(x)
PV (x)
)q) 1q
6 ǫ−
1
p (by the extreme points technique).
(b)
(
Ex←V
∣∣A(x)−A′(x)∣∣p) 1p = O (√pℓ ) for some A which is of complexity ℓ
relative to A′4 (by standard facts on convex-approximation [DHA97]).
Setting ℓ = δ−2 log(1/ǫ) (so that A ∈ A), taking X = V |E which corresponds
to A′ according to Proposition 1, setting p = 2 log(1/ǫ) and putting this all
together we get Proposition 5. This implies the following statement
Proposition 3 ( Strong Statement ). For some X ∈ C we have v(X,A) 6 δ
for every A ∈ A′.
which proves Theorem 1 (|v(X,A)| 6 δ follows by considering A′ closed under
complements).
2.2 A (new) optimal hardcore lemma for metric pseudoentropy and
applications to transformations.
Pseudoentropy notions extend classical information-theoretic entropy notions
into computational settings. The following most widely used entropy notions
capture what it means to be “computationally close” to a high entropy distri-
bution.
2 We can think of measures M such that M(·) 6 PV (·) and
∑
x
M(x) > ǫ. Every
X ∈ C can be written as PX(·) =M(·)/
∑
x
M(x) for one of these measures M .
3 Following related works [FOR12,RTTV08] we use circuits with real outputs for tech-
nical reasons.
4 That is, A is a convex combination of ℓ members of A′
Definition 1 (HILL Pseudoentropy [HILL99]). Let Y be a distribution
with the following property: there exists Y ′ of min-entropy at least k such that
for every A of size at most s we have |EA(Y ) − EY ′)| 6 ǫ. Then we say that
X has k bits of HILL entropy of quality (s, ǫ) and denote by HHILLs,ǫ (Y ) > k.
Definition 2 (Metric Pseudoentropy [BSW03]). Let Y be a distribution
with the following property: for every A of size at most s there exists Y ′ of min-
entropy at least k such that we have |EA(Y )− EY ′)| 6 ǫ. Then we say that X
has k bits of metric entropy of quality (s, ǫ) and denote by HMetrics,ǫ (Y ) > k.
Pseudoentropy is an important research area, with applications in deterministic
encryption, memory delegation [CKLR11], pseudorandom generators [HILL99,VZ].
Metric Pseudoentropy is much easier to deal with, and fortunately can be con-
verted into HILL entropy with some loss in quality parameters (s, ǫ).
Our contribution. The following results shows that any distribution with
metric pseudoentropy of ‘moderate” quality has a kernel of HILL entropy with
“strong” quality. We also conclude the optimal Metric-HILL transformation.
Theorem 2 (A HILL-pseudoentropy hardcore for metric pseudoen-
tropy). Suppose that HMetrics,ǫ (Y ) > n − ∆, for some Y ∈ {0, 1}n. Then there
is an event E, of probability 1 − ǫ such that HHILLs′,δ (Y |E) > n − ∆ with s′ =
Ω(sδ2/(∆+ 1)) for every δ. In particular, HHILLs′,ǫ+δ(Y ) > n−∆
One possible application of this fact is amplifying hardness of pseudoentropy with
poor quality. Imagine that we have many independent samples X1, X2, . . . , Xn
from a distribution with a substantial entropy amount (∆ ≪ n) but of weak
advantage ǫ = 0.99. We can use the result above to show that pseudoentropy in
X1, X2, . . . , Xn is roughly (1 − 0.99)(n − ∆) with good quality (see [Skob] for
more details). Below we briefly compare this result with related works.
(a) Our result is far stronger than the classical result due to Barak et al. [BSW03]
about the transformation. Not only we replace the factor n by ∆, but also
show the existence of a hardcore in the intermediate step.
(b) This result unifies and improves our recent results [Skoa,Skob]. The corollary
HHILLs′,ǫ+δ(Y ) > n − ∆ was the same (and optimal) but the hardcore E was
found with worse complexity s′ = Ω(s · δ2/n).
(c) Our result explains the nature of the Metric-HILL transformation. The HILL
pseudoentropy hardcore is an intermediate step in going from Metric pseu-
doentropy to HILL pseudoentropy.
Our result is illustrated in Figure 1. The parameters are optimal (see [Skob]).
A sketch of proof. Let A be the set of real-valued circuits of size s and let
A′ be the set of circuits of size s′ = sδ2/(∆+1). Let C consists of the conditional
distributions X of the form X ′|E, where Pr[E] > 1 − ǫ and H∞(X ′) > n −∆;
this set is convex. The payoff is defined as v(X,A)
def
= EA(Y ) − EA(X). It is
easy to see5 that we have
5 This is trivial for boolean A and somewhat more tricky for real-valued A. A short
proof is given implicitly in [FOR12]
HMetrics,ǫ (Y ) > n−∆ HHILLs′,ǫ′ (Y |E) > n−∆ HHILLs′′,ǫ′′(Y ) > n−∆
s′ = s · δ2/(∆+ 1)
ǫ′ = δ
δ arbitrary,Pr[E] = 1− ǫ,
(this paper)
s′′ = s′
ǫ′′ = ǫ′ + ǫ
δ arbitrary
(trivial)
s′′ = s · δ2/(∆+ 1)
ǫ′′ = ǫ+ δ
δ arbitrary
([Skoa,BSW03])
Fig. 1: The Metric-to-HILL pseudoentropy transformation.
Proposition 4 ( Weak Statement ). ∀A ∈ A ∃X ∈ C v(X,A) 6 0.
Now we analyze what happens when A is replaced by conv(A′).
Proposition 5 (Approximation Step). For every A′ ∈ conv(A′) we have
v(X,A′) 6 δ for some X ∈ C.
To prove this, by the Ho¨lder Inequality for any A,A′ and X ∈ C we show
|v(X,A)− v(X,A′)| 6 (Ex←U (2nPY |E(x))q) 1q · (Ex←U ∣∣A(x)−A′(x)∣∣p) 1p
for any p, q > 1, 1p +
1
q = 1 and the uniform distribution U . Now we argue that
(a)
(
Ex←U
(
2nPY |E(x)
)q) 1q
6 2
∆
p (by the extreme points technique).
(b)
(
Ex←V
∣∣A(x)−A′(x)∣∣p) 1p = O (√pℓ ) for some A which is of complexity ℓ
relative to A′ (by standard facts on convex-approximation [DHA97]).
Setting ℓ = δ−2(∆+1) (so that A ∈ A), taking X = X ′|E which corresponds to
A
′ according to Proposition 1, setting p = ∆ + 1 and putting this all together
we get Proposition 5. This implies the following statement
Proposition 6 ( Strong Statement ). ∃X ∈ C ∀A ∈ A′ v(X,A) 6 δ.
This directly implies Theorem 2 (as before, we consider A′ closed under com-
plements). More details can be found in Appendix D.
2.3 A (fixed) construction of a simulator for auxiliary inputs.
In [JP14] there is a theorem, which says that any short information Z about X
can be efficienly simulated from X , Below we state the corrected version [Pie15].
Theorem 3 (Simulating auxiliary inputs, flaws fixed). For any random
variable X ∈ {0, 1}n, any correlated Z ∈ {0, 1}λ and every choice of parame-
ters (ǫ, s) there is a randomized function Sim : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}λ of complexity
O
(
s · 24λǫ−4) such that Z and Sim (X) are (ǫ, s)-indistinguishable given X.
This result is the key component in the simplified analysis of the EUROCRYPT’09
stream cipher construction. Using Theorem 3, as described in [JP14], one proves
the resilience of the cipher (assuming bounded leakage in every round) and if
the underlying weak PRF is (s, ǫ)-secure against two queries on random inputs.
The cipher security (s′, ǫ′) is related to (s, ǫ) by a polynomial loss in ǫ.
Our contribution. We describe a flaw in the proof and improve the corrected
bound by a significant super polynomial factor. Below we briefly describe the
significance of our result
(a) Discovered flaws in the recent (TCC’14) analysis of the EUROCRYPT’09
stream cipher. The alternative bounds seem correct but are much weaker. In
particular, we get no meaningful security with the AES used as a weak PRF
in this construction6. This raises the problem of whether the cipher built on
AES is secure or not. We would need a simulator with a loss of only O(ǫ−2)
not ǫ−4 in complexity.
(b) A simpler construction based on the min-max theorem. Based on the frame-
work in Section 1.3 we give an alternative proof achieving the simulator com-
plexity of O
(
s · 22λǫ−4)). The gain of 22λ over the original approach, which
is a power of ǫ for recommended values of parameters [JP14], comes from the
use of convex approximation techniques. Our proof is considerably simpler
and quantitatively better than in [JP14] (in particular we don’t need to use
the min-max theorem twice depending on what is the value of the game).
Also, it is much simpler than the alternative approach of Vadhan and Zheng
[VZ], yet yields comparable results for small leakages (see Table 2).
(c) A clear bound on the security level, in terms of the time-success ratio. We de-
rive a clear formula which shows what fraction of the security of the original
weak PRF is transformed into security of the stream cipher. This analysis
shows that we are far from good and provable secure leakage-resilient stream
ciphers as we lose over 56 of original security. For more details, see Table 2.
In Table 2 we compare the strength of the simulator theorems in terms of implied
security for this construction. To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of the
time-success ratio for this technique. For more details we refer to Appendix E.
More on the flaws. In the claimed better bound O
(
s · 23λǫ−2) there is a
mistake on page 18 (eprint version), when the authors enforce a signed measure
to be a probability measure by a mass shifting argument. The numberM defined
there is in fact a function of x and is hard to compute, whereas the original
6 The final bounds on the cipher security depends on the simulator complexity and
are given by ǫ′ = O
(√
2λǫ
)
and s′ = s ·2−4λǫ′4. We can’t prove then even very weak
security ǫ′ = 2−32 having λ = 10 bits of leakage!
Author Technique Simulator Complexity Implied Security
[JP14] Standard Min-Max + L∞-approx. sh = s · 24λǫ−4 k′ = k6 − 56λ
[VZ] Complicated Boosting sh = s · 2λǫ−2 + 2λǫ−4 k′ = k6 − 13λ
this paper Standard Min-Max + Lp-approx. sh = s · 22λǫ−4 k′ = k6 − 12λ
Table 2: Security of the EUROCRYPT’09 stream cipher instantiated with a
wPRF having 2k keys and λ bits of leakage, obtained from different simulator
results. Every attacker of size s succeeds with prob. at most s/2k
′
.
proof assumes that this is a constant independent of x. In the alternative bound
O
(
s · 23λǫ−2) a fixable flaw is a missing factor of 2λ in the complexity (page 16
in the eprint version), which is because what is constructed in the proof is only
a probability mass function, not yet a sampler [Pie15].
A sketch of the proof. Let A be the set of real-valued circuits of size s
and let A′ be the set of circuits of size s′ = s · 2−2λǫ2. Let C′ consists of the
distributions of the form X,h(X), where h is computable in size s ·2λ; this set is
not convex. Let C be the set of all circuits of size s ·22λǫ−2. The payoff is defined
as v(h,A)
def
= EA(X,h(X))− EA(X,Z). It is easy to see that we have
Proposition 7 ( Weak Statement ). ∀A ∈ A ∃h′ ∈ C′ v(h′, A) 6 0.
Indeed, consider h+
A
which for every x outputs this value z for which A(x, z) =
maxA(x, ·) and h−
A
which for every x outputs this value z for which A(x, z) =
minA(x, ·). Both are of complexity O (2λ). Since we have EA(X,h−(X)) 6
EA(X,Z) and EA(X,Z) 6 EA(X,h+(X)), setting h′ to be a distribution over
h+ and h− that is Pr[h′(x) = z] = θ · Pr[h−(x) = z] + (1 − θ) · Pr[h+(x) = z],
we get v(h′,A) = 0 with some θ. In the next step we replace A′ by conv(A′).
Proposition 8 ( Approximation 1 ). ∀A ∈ convA′ ∃h′ ∈ C′ : v(h′,A′) 6 ǫ.
This follows from the standard Chernoff Bound approximation argument7 as
|v(h′, A)− v(h′, A′)| = |EA(X,h′(X))− EA′(X,h′(X))| 6 sup
x,z
|A(x, z)−A′(x, z)|.
Now we replace C′ by conv C′. Here a more delicate approximation is required.
Proposition 9 ( Approximation 2). For every A and every h′ ∈ conv C′
there exists h ∈ C such that v(h,A) 6 v(h′,A) + ǫ.
This follows because by the Ho¨lder Inequality applied to p = q = 2 we obtain
|EA(X,h′(X))− EA(X,h(X))| 6 2 λ2 ·
(
E
x∼X
∑
z
∣∣Px,h(x)(x, z)−Px,h′(x)(x,z)∣∣2
) 1
2
,
7 A can be viewed as a distribution on A′ we simply pick ℓ independent samples {Ai}i
and try to find an approximator of the form A′ = 1
ℓ
∑ℓ
i=1
Ai. It deviates by more
than ǫ at (x, z) with probability exp(−2ℓǫ2). We combine this with the union bound.
and by the standard results on convex approximation [DDGS97] the second
factor is at most ℓ−
1
2 for some h of complexity ℓ with respect to C′. We put
ℓ = 2λǫ−2. From the proven propositions we obtain the final result.
Proposition 10 ( Strong Statement). ∃h ∈ C ∀A ∈ A′ v(h,A) 6 2ǫ.
2.4 More Applications
For more applications we refer an interested reader to Appendix A. They in-
clude the optimal Dense Model Theorem, a better auxiliary input simulator
for bounded-variance adversaries (new), and a proof that every high-conditional
entropy source can be efficiently simulated (new, extending [TTV08]).
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A More Applications
.
A.1 Dense Model Theorem
Given a pair of two distributions W and V over the same finite domain we say
that W is δ-dense in V if and only if Pr[W = x] 6 Pr[V = x]/δ8. The efficient
version of the famous dense model theorem specialized to the boolean case, can
be formulated as follows:
Theorem 4 (Dense Model Theorem.). Let D′ be a class of n-bit boolean
functions, R be uniform over {0, 1}n, X be an n-bit random variable and let X ′ be
δ-dense in X. If X and R are (D, ǫ)-indistinguishable then there exists a distribu-
tion R′ which is δ-dense in R such that X ′ and R′ are (D′, ǫ′)-indistinguishable,
where ǫ′ = (ǫ/δ)O(1) and D consists of all functions of the form g(D1, . . . , Dℓ)
where Di ∈ D′, ℓ = poly(1/δ, 1/ǫ) and g is some function.
Using our framework we can reprove the Dense Model Theorem with opti-
mal parameters due to Zhang [Zha11]. The proof is very similar to the one
in Theorem 2 so we omit the details; we note that we need the Ho¨lder Inequality
with p = 2 log(1/δ). A similar technique appears in [Skoa], though we do note
use Metric pseudoentropy here.
Corollary 1. Dense Model Theorem (Theorem 4) holds with ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ), g
being a linear threshold and ℓ = O(log(1/δ)/(ǫ/δ)2.
Author Technique Function g ℓ as complexity of D′ w.r.t D ǫ′ vs ǫ
Tao and Ziegler Complicated Inefficient ℓ = poly(1/(ǫ/δ), log(1/δ)) ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ)
[RTTV08] Min-Max Theorem Linear threshold poly(1/(ǫ/δ), log(1/δ)) ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ)
[FOR12], [DP08] Metric Entropy Linear threshold ℓ = O(n/(ǫ/δ)2) ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ)
[Zha11] Boosting Linear threshold ℓ = O(log(1/δ)/(ǫ/δ)2 ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ)
This paper Standard Min-Max + Lp-approx Linear threshold ℓ = O(log(1/δ)/(ǫ/δ)
2 ǫ′ = O(ǫ/δ)
Table 3: Different versions of the Dense Model Theorem
A.2 Simulating auxiliary inputs against bounded-variance
distinguishers
An interesting result is obtained when working more carefully in the proof of
Theorem 3. Namely, imposing additional restriction on the second moment of
test functions we obtain a refined bound
8 The term “δ-dense” comes from the fact that V can be written as a convex combi-
nation of W with weight δ and some other distribution with weight 1− δ
Theorem 5 (Simulating auxiliary inputs against bounded-variance dis-
tinguishers). For any random variable X ∈ {0, 1}n, any correlated Z ∈ {0, 1}λ,
any class A be of functions A : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}m → [0, 1] such that ∀A ∈ A :
EX VarA(x, U) 6 σ
2, and every ǫ there is a randomized function Sim : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}λ of complexity O (s · 24λσǫ−4) relative to A such that Z and Sim (X) are
ǫ-indistinguishable given X by functions A.
This result is interesting in the context of recent improvements in key derivation,
so called square security, where the second moment condition is widely used.
A.3 Simulating High Entropy Distribution with Auxiliary
Information
From our framework we derive the following result, which is the extension of
the theorem in [TTV08] into a conditional case (in the presence of auxiliary
information). We stress that this result cannot be derived from the techniques
used in [TTV08], because this approach will not preserve the same marginal
distribution Z, when applied in the conditional setting.
Theorem 6 (High conditional min-entropy is simulatable). Let X ∈
{0, 1}n and Z ∈ {0, 1}m be correlated random variables and H∞(X |Z) = n−∆.
Then there exists a distribution Y, Z such that
(a) There is a circuit Sim of complexity O
(
n(n+m)22∆ǫ−5
)
and such that
Sim(Z)
d
= Y
(b) (X,Z) and (Y, Z) are (s, ǫ)-indistinguishable
(c) We have H∞(Y |Z) > n−∆− 6.
Here we show only how to simulate given a fixed distinguisher. The rest of the
proof follows by the use of a convex approximation argument (with p = q = 2)
and allows us to save a factor of 22∆ in the simulator complexity.
Proof (Proof of the weak statement). Let ∆ = n− k. By replacing ǫ with 2ǫ we
can assume that D =∑ji=1 αiDi where αi = 1− (i− 1)ǫ for i = 1, . . . , ⌈1/ǫ⌉ and
Di are boolean such that 1 =
∑
iDi. Define
d(i) = Pr[D(U) > αi]. (6)
and let M be the smallest number i such that d(i) > 2−∆. Note that if we didn’t
care about computational efficiency then the best answer would be
Y +
d
=
d(M − 1)
2−∆
· UD1+...+DM−1 +
2−∆ − d(M − 1)
2−∆
· UDM (7)
because then
ED(Y +) =
∑M−1
i=1 αi|Di|+
(
2k −∑M−1i=1 αi|Di|)αM
2k
= max
Y : H∞(Y )>k
ED(Y ) (8)
The approach we chose is quite obvious - we efficiently approximate the distri-
bution Y +. For any i, sample x1, . . . , xℓ where ℓ > 2
∆n log(1/ǫ)/ǫ and let
d˜(i) = ℓ−1
ℓ∑
j=1
1{D(xi)>αi} (9)
Now let M ′ be the smallest number such that d˜(M ′) > 34 · 2−∆. Note that that
M ′ is well defined with probability 1− 2−n, and then we have
d˜(M ′ − 1) < 3
4
· 2−∆ < d˜(M ′) (10)
Now we define Y as follows:
Y
d
=

d˜(M ′−1)
2−∆
· U˜D1+...+DM′−1 +
(
1− d˜(M ′−1)
2−∆
)
· U˜DM′ 2−∆ǫ < d˜(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆/16
U˜D1+...+DM′−1 , 2
−∆/16 < d˜(M ′ − 1)
U˜DM′ , 2
−∆ǫ > d˜(M ′ − 1)
(11)
Observe that if d(i) < 2−∆/4 then with probability 1−2−n we get d˜(i) < 2−∆/2.
Thus, the probability that d(M ′) < 2−∆/4 and d˜(M ′) > 2−∆/2 is at most
2−n log(1/ǫ) and we can assume that d(M ′) > 2−∆/4. Similarly, if d(i) > 2−∆
then with probability 1 − 2−n we have d˜(i) > 34 · 2−∆ which means M ′ 6 i.
Therefore, with probability 1−2−n log(1/ǫ) we can assume that d(M ′−1) < 2−∆.
Now we split the analysis into the following cases
(a) d˜(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆ǫ and d(M ′ − 1) < 2 · 2−∆ǫ. Since |DM ′ | = 2n(d(M ′) −
d(M ′−1)) > 2n−∆/8, we see that UDM′ is samplable in time O
(
2∆ log(1/ǫ)
)
and that H∞(UDM′ ) > k − 3. Note that
ED(Y +) = ED(Y +)1D(Y +)>αM′−1 +ED(Y
+)1D(Y +)6αM′
6 2ǫ+ αM ′
6 3ǫ+ED(Y ) (12)
(b) d˜(M ′ − 1) > 2−∆/16 and 2−∆ > d(M ′ − 1) > 2−∆/32. Then we have
|D1|+ . . .+ |DM ′−1| > 2n−∆−5 and thus H∞(U˜D1+...+DM′−1) > n−∆ − 5
and U˜D1+...+DM′−1 is samplable in time O
(
2∆ log(1/ǫ)
)
. Since |D1|+ . . .+
|DM ′−1| 6 2n−∆, we have
ED(Y +) 6 ED(UD1+...+DM′−1)
6 ED(U˜D1+...+DM′−1) + ǫ (13)
(c) 2−∆ǫ < d˜(M ′−1) < 2−∆/16 and 2−∆ǫ/2 < d(M ′−1) < 2−∆/8 and d˜(M ′−
1) 6 2d(M ′ − 1). We have |D1|+ . . . + |DM ′−1| = 2nd(M ′ − 1) > 2n−∆ǫ/2
and |DM ′ | = 2n(d(M ′)− d(M ′ − 1)) > 2n−∆/8, therefore Y is samplable in
time O (2∆ log(1/ǫ)/ǫ). Moreover, we haveH∞(U˜D1+...+DM′−1) > log(|D1|+
. . . + |DM ′−1|) and H∞(U˜DM′ ) > log |DM ′ |. Hence H∞(U˜D1+...+DM′−1) >
n+ log d(M ′ − 1) and H∞(U˜DM′ ) > n−∆− 3 and
Pr[Y = x] 6
d˜(M ′ − 1)
d(M ′ − 1) · 2
−n+∆ + 2−n+∆+3
6 2−n+∆+4 (14)
Suppose now that d(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆ǫ/2. Then, by the Chernoff Bound with
probability 1 − 2−n we have d˜(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆ǫ/2 + d(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆ǫ and we
are in case (a). If 2−∆ǫ/2 < d(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆/32 then with probability 1− 2−n
we have 12 <
d˜(M ′−1)
d(M ′−1) < 2 and it is easy to check that we can be either in (a)
or in (c), depending on d˜(M ′ − 1). If 2−∆/32 < d(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆/8 then with
probability 1− 2−n we are either in (c) or in (b). If 2−∆/8 < d(M ′ − 1) < 2−∆
then with probability 1− 2−n we can be only in (b).
B Convex Approximation Rates
We use the following fact on convex approximation rates.
Lemma 1 (Convex approximation in Lp spaces [DDGS97]). Let X be a
finite domain, ν be a distribution on X . Fix a number 1 6 p < +∞ and for
any function f on X define ‖f‖p = (Ex←ν |f(x)|p)
1
p . Let G be any set of real
functions on X , let g be a convex combinations of functions from G and K > 0
be such that for all g ∈ G we have ‖g− g‖p 6 K. Then for any ℓ > 0 there exists
a convex combination g′ =
∑ℓ
i=1 αigi of functions g1, . . . , gk ∈ G such that
‖g − g′‖p 6 KCp
ℓ1−
1
t
where t = min(2, p) and Cp = 1 if 1 6 p 6 2, Cp =
√
2[Γ ((p+ 1)/2)/
√
π]1/p for
2 < p < +∞.
C Proof of Theorem 2
To finish the proof it remains to justify the estimates(
Ex←U
(
2nPY |E(x)
)q) 1q
6 2
∆
p (15)
and(
Ex←V
∣∣A(x)−A′(x)∣∣p) 1p = O(√p
ℓ
)
for A of complexity ℓ r. t. A′ (16)
The first follows by noticing that the quantity is convex with respect to Y |E ∈ C.
Thus, the maximum is attained at one of extreme points which is, in this case,
a flat distribution. The second fact follows from Lemma 1.
D Proof of Theorem 2
To finish the proof it remains to justify the estimates(
Ex←U
(
2nPY |E(x)
)q) 1q
6 2
∆
p (17)
and(
Ex←V
∣∣A(x)−A′(x)∣∣p) 1p = O(√p
ℓ
)
for A of complexity ℓ r. t. A′ (18)
The first follows by noticing that the quantity is convex with respect to Y |E ∈ C.
Thus, the maximum is attained at one of extreme points which is, in this case,
a flat distribution. The second fact follows from Lemma 1.
E Time-Success Ratio for Auxiliary Input Simulator
Analysis of Stream Ciphers
E.1 Preliminaries
Weak pseudorandom functions, are indistinguishable from random functions,
when queried on random inputs and fed with iniform secret key.
Definition 3 (Weak pseudorandom functions). A function F : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}m is an (ǫ, s, q)-secure weak PRF if its outputs on q random
inputs are indistinguishable from random by any distinguisher of size s, that is
|Pr [D ((Xi)qi=1 ,F((K,Xi)qi=1) = 1]− Pr [D ((Xi)qi=1 , (Ri)qi=1) = 1]| 6 ǫ
where the probability is over the choice of the random Xi ← {0, 1}n, the choice
of a random key K ← {0, 1}k and Ri ← {0, 1}m conditioned on Ri = Rj if
Xi = Xj for some j < i.
Stream ciphers generate a keystream in a recursive manner. The security means
that the output stream should be indistinguishable from uniform9.
Definition 4 (Stream ciphers). A stream-cipher SC : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n is a function that need to be initialized with a secret state S0 ∈ {0, 1}k
and produces a sequence of output blocks X1, X2, ... computed as
(Si, Xi) := SC(Si−1).
A stream cipher SC is (ǫ, s, q)-secure if for all 1 6 i 6 q, the random variable Xi
is (s, ǫ)-pseudorandom given X1, ..., Xi−1 (the probability is also over the choice
of the initial random key S0).
9 We note that in a more standard notion the entire stream X1, . . . , Xq is indistin-
guishable from random. This is implied by the notion above by a standard hybrid
argument, with a loss of a multiplicative factor of q in the distinguishing advantage.
Now we define the security of leakage resilient stream ciphers, which follow the
“only computation leaks” assumption.
Definition 5 (Leakage-resilient stream ciphers). A leakage-resilient stream-
cipher is (ǫ, s, q, λ)-secure if it is (ǫ, s, q)-secure as defined above, but where
the distinguisher in the j-th round gets λ bits of arbitrary deceptively chosen
leakage about the secret state accessed during this round. More precisely, be-
fore (Sj , Xj) := SC(Sj1) is computed, the distinguisher can choose any leakage
function fj with range {0, 1}λ, and then not only get Xj, but also Λj := fj(Sˆj1),
where Sˆj1 denotes the part of the secret state that was modified (i.e., read and/or
overwritten) in the computation SC(Sj1).
Finally, we recall the standard notion of time-success ratio. It is very useful in
quantifying how much security is transformed from the underlying primitive to
the constructed object by the reduction.
Definition 6 (Time-Success Ratio). We say that a cryptographic protocol
has k bits of security (or that it is 2k-secure) if for every s and any adversary
A of size s the advantage A (probability of winning in the security game) is at
most ǫ 6 s/2k.
E.2 Time-Success Ratio Analysis
Suppose that we have a simulator which guarantees if we have a simulator
with complexity th = O
(
t · Aǫ−α +Bǫ−β) then, according to [JP14], we have a
(s′, ǫ′, q)-secure stream cipher where
ǫ′ = O
(
q ·
√
2λǫ
)
, s′ = Ω
(
s ·A−1(ǫ′)α)−A−1B(ǫ′)α−β (19)
Suppose that we want to prove 2k
′
-security in the sense of Definition 6. That
is, we need to prove s′/ǫ′ > 2k
′
for every time-advantage pair (s′, ǫ′) such that
s′ > 1, where k′ is possibly big. Note that for a weak PRF we can assume the
security s ≈ 2kǫ for every ǫ, that is that the best attack is by a brute-force search
over the key space (see [JP14] for more justifiction). One can argue that, under
the transformation (19), the worst-case adversary profile is when ǫ′ ≈ 2−k′ and
s′ ≈ 1. Pugging this in Equation (19), and using the fact that s′ > 1 we obtain
2k · 2−2k′−λ > A ·
(
2−k
′
)−α
+B ·
(
2−k
′
)−β
.
Substituting different values of A,B, α, β which correspond to the particular
bounds, we get the values in Table 2.
